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CONSTITUTIONAL FORBEARANCE
A. Christopher Bryant

∗

INTRODUCTION

Five district judges have ruled on the constitutionality of
the individual mandate of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (ACA),1 also sometimes referred to as “Obamacare.”2
The two appointed by Republican Presidents held that the mandate
violated the Constitution, while the three appointed by Democratic
Presidents upheld the law. In the wake of these rulings, countless
commentators quickly inferred that the judges’ political
preferences and affiliations were deciding factors and forecast that
the seemingly inevitable Supreme Court decision of the matter
would split the High Court 5-4, with Justice Kennedy casting the
deciding vote. The four other Justices appointed by Republicans
are expected to vote to invalidate the law, and the four Justices
appointed by Democrats are expected to vote to sustain it.3
How we came to this juncture, why, and who bears the
blame are difficult and divisive questions. But for reasons
∗
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1
Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), as amended by the Health Care and
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029
(2010).
2
See, e.g., Milton R. Wolf, Buck Up and Stop Obamacare; GOP Should Seek
Approval from Tea Party, Not Democratic Party, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011,
at B3.
3
See infra note 219 and accompanying text.

explored below all concerned ought to able to agree that the
current state of affairs is regrettable, if not intolerable. In short, as
the Obamacare cases starkly illustrate, our constitutional law too
often both looks and is too much like ordinary, partisan politics by
another means. Putting aside questions about the provenance of
the present dilemma, this essay ventures a claim about the way out
of it. Ironically the same cases that so plainly exhibit the problem
also provide a means to begin solving it.
At the most basic level the solution requires the recovery of
a creditable distinction between constitutional law and partisan
politics. This distinction depends upon, among other things,
regular public displays that such a distinction can and does exist.
The single, most effective way to exhibit the difference between
law and politics is for judges to refrain from advancing politically
desirable (to them) ends out of a respect for contrary constitutional
law. A judge who exercises this sort of self-restraint engages in
constitutional forbearance. And the Obamacare cases present the
Roberts Court with a singular opportunity for its conservative
members to exercise noble, notable, and healing constitutional
forbearance.
This essay begins by developing the concept of
constitutional forbearance and exploring the role it properly plays
in the craft of good judging. This first Part also illustrates what is
meant by constitutional forbearance by recovering a forgotten but
illustrative example from a century ago. Part II then argues that
the need for forbearance has at present become unusually acute.
Finally, in Part III this essay identifies some of the qualities of the
Obamacare cases that make them such excellent opportunities for
the exercise of this much needed judicial virtue and answers some
anticipated objections to thinking about the cases in this way.

I. Forbearance As A Constitutional Virtue
In general, forbearance is an undervalued virtue. To some
extent, this is inevitable, as forbearance tends by its very nature to
be invisible. Conspicuous forbearance may be an oxymoron. Yet
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it is hard to resist the conclusion that prior ages valued forbearance
more than our own. Ancient historians celebrated Cincinnatus as
singularly noble because of his surrender of dictatorial authority
and return to a pacific and pastoral lifestyle when the military
threat to Rome had been neutralized.4 This myth in turn echoed in
founding era paeans to George Washington, who on multiple
occasions declined opportunities to assert or seize power in
deference to an emerging culture of constitutional, civilian
republican government.5 Well into the nineteenth century, the
equation of nobility with forbearance in the exercise of power
exerted discernable influence on public discourse. But by the end
of the twentieth century, forbearance was markedly less likely to
figure prominently in narratives of noble public service. When
historians were asked to rank the U.S. Presidents, the results
reflected a distinct preference for men of bold, even legally
dubious action, over their more restrained colleagues.6
A. The Value of Judicial Forbearance
One social sphere where a culture of forbearance arguably
lingered well into twentieth century was the realm of jurists.
Indeed, forbearance might be the virtue most indispensable to
4

See Jim Chen, The American Ideology, VAND. L. REV. 809, 816 n.33 (1995).
See generally GARY WILLS, CINCINNATUS: GEORGE WASHINGTON & THE
ENLIGHTENMENT 3 (1984) (describing Washington as “a virtuoso of
resignations”); see also Gordon Wood, The Greatness of George Washington,
68 VA.Q.REV. 189 (1992) (asserting that the “greatest act of his life, the one that
made him famous, was his resignation as commander-in-chief” of the
Continental Army after the conclusion of the Revolutionary War).
6
See, e.g., William Douglas, Presidential Legacy; Is Truman Bounce in the
Future for Bush?; Scholars Debate Whether His Status Will Increase After He
Leaves Office, THE HOUS. CHRON., Aug. 26, 2007, at 15 ; but see Ivan Eland,
Op-Ed., From Van Buren to Bush, a Better Way to Rank US Presidents, THE
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 20, 1999, at 9. (arguing that it is “time to rethink
the way we rate presidents” and that “Presidential rankings should be based on
different standards: Did the president uphold the Constitution, and have an
agenda that contributed to peace, prosperity, and liberty, and was he reasonably
adept at getting that agenda implemented?”).
5
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virtuous judging. In our constitutional order, the judiciary is
uniquely tasked to enforce fundamental policy determinations not
of its own making.7 After all, the whole theory of judicial review
is not that the courts may correct legislative missteps but rather
that the judicial duty to the law includes the obligation to enforce
higher law at the expense of a statute when the two are found to be
in irreconcilable conflict.8 That this classical explanation of
judicial review is viewed with skepticism in many quarters
provides all the more reason for judges to act so as to shore up the
distinction between constitutional law and politics.
And constitutional forbearance is the most effective way to
accomplish this goal. As a general matter, legal forbearance
occurs whenever any public official exercises authority to produce
a result that is, in her eyes, suboptimal but nonetheless required by
law. The concept of the rule of law envisions and requires nothing
less if law is to be anything more than a loose set of discretionary
guidelines to persons in power. A Judge or Justice engages in
constitutional forbearance whenever she concludes that her policy
preferences conflict with what the Constitution requires, and she
then rules in conformity with the latter and in disregard of the
former.
In so doing, she offers herself as living proof that
constitutional law is not just politics by other means. It is worth
noting that forbearance, so understood, does not necessarily equate
to deference to the political branches of government. To the
contrary, forbearance would include invalidation of a wise or even
a crucially important statute (in the judge’s estimation), if the
Constitution (in the judge’s estimation) prohibits such a law. Of
course, forbearance would also include acquiescence in a
constitutional statute that the judge believed to be an invitation to
disaster or even a mandate of manifest injustice.

7

See DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST
HUNDRED YEARS, 1789-1888, at xii (1992) (“[W]hen a judge swears to uphold
the Constitution, he promises obedience to a set of rules laid down by someone
else.”).
8
See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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We might hope that our constitutional law would be
sufficiently enlightened that it would only rarely permit (or
proscribe) that which thoughtful people oppose (or support). But
to the extent that any separation exists between constitutional law
and judicial policy preferences (often about enormously important
and complex matters over which reasonable people profoundly
disagree), such cases are not only inevitable but should be
common. In this sense, the measure of a good or virtuous judge
would not be the frequency with which she does “the right thing”
as she perceives it, but rather the frequency with which she
abstains from doing so in the name of a contrary legal rule. To the
extent that the Constitution is to be distinct from politics, this
measure should be no less applicable to constitutional than to
contract law. If anything, given the inherent ambiguity of a
constitution with such capacious clauses as ours has, and intended
to endure as long as it has and (we hope) will, forbearance in the
use of the power of judicial review to accomplish what are, in a
judge’s eyes, desirable ends may be even more essential to
constitutional legal faith than any other subject addressed by law.9
As noted above, the traditional justification for judicial
review depends upon the assumption that the Constitution supplies
a rule that trumps any contrary rule supplied by a mere statute.10
One need not believe the judicial process a mechanistic one to
conclude that the judge should be significantly constrained in
discovering the rule the Constitution provides. This understanding
of judicial review in effect assigns to the judge a crucially
important but sharply limited role. The judge is but one actor in a
larger drama designed to achieve the public good to the extent that
is humanly possible. But the authors of the play did not limit
themselves to an extended judicial soliloquy. Rather, the judge is
merely one agent in what is meant to be, collectively, a moral
9

Cf. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Partial-Birth Abortion and the Perils of
Constitutional Common Law, 31 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 519, 587-88 (2008)
(identifying and discussing some of the negative effects of the politicization of
constitutional law).
10
See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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system. Of course the concept of such a limited role should be
familiar to any lawyer in an adversarial system such as our own.11
The notion provides the logically sufficient answer to that
notorious question used to bedevil lawyers: how can you represent
people like that (i.e., people guilty of crimes, or harms to the
environment, or outrageous avarice, etc.)?12 The lawyer has
accepted a limited and, in isolation, amoral role in service of a
larger scheme designed to serve moral ends.13 One need only
consider that the alternative system is deemed “inquisitorial” to get
a fairly good sense of why the adversarial system might be thought
a morally compelling one.
A judge similarly accepts an
indispensable, but circumscribed role in a larger system of
government carefully wrought, on balance, best to advance the
public good over the long term.
The logic of the matter, in the case of both the advocate and
the judge, is fairly straightforward. But obedience to the limits on
one’s role can be psychologically trying in the extreme.14 This
duty requires a judge to subordinate her own view of the public
good to the assessment of others and then to carry that assessment
into effect in concrete circumstances, which may not have been
fully envisioned when the general policy was formulated and, in
any event, which the judge has come to know far more intimately
than would ever be possible for a legislator acting ex ante. In other
words, the judge confronts the particular persons to whom abstract
decisions, with which the judge may or may not agree, are to be
applied. When a judge is called to serve as an agent in effecting
(what the judge believes to be) a misguided or even immoral result,
11

See generally MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYER’S ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY
SYSTEM (1975).
12
See, e.g., JAMES S. KUNEN, “HOW CAN YOU DEFEND THOSE PEOPLE?”: THE
MAKING OF A CRIMINAL LAWYER (1983).
13
Id.
14
Cf. Terry A. Maroney, Emotional Regulation and Judicial Behavior, 99 CAL.
L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript at 8), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1785616 (stressing that “judges are engaged in an
occupation that involves ‘emotional regulation’”).
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the judge suffers a profound cognitive dissonance,15 in much the
same way would an attorney charged with representing a client the
attorney believed to be in the wrong.16 In both cases the human
mind recoils from this uncomfortable tension and seeks to avoid
it.17 Thus, a danger arises that the judge will, consciously or
unconsciously, distort her perception of the facts or understanding
of the law in an effort to escape this dilemma.18 The inevitable
propensity to psychological self-defense creates a corresponding
risk of cognitive biases,19 even (perhaps especially) among those
judges most committed to an honorable satisfaction of their official
responsibilities.
This natural drift in the direction of a judge’s own
preferences must be countered with an equal and opposite force
15

See generally LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
(1957). Festinger described cognitive dissonance as the result of discord among
an individual’s knowledge, opinions, and beliefs. See id. at 1-3, 9-15. He argued
that the presence of dissonance motivates its subject to engage in dissonance
reduction or dissonance avoidance. See id. at 29-31, 263-66. Numerous legal
scholars have recognized the relevance of these insights for understanding and
evaluating judicial behavior. See, e.g., Cheryl L. Anderson, Ideological
Dissonance, Disability Backlash, and the ADA Amendments Act, 55 WAYNE L.
REV. 1267, 1297 (2009); Alafair S. Burke, Improving Prosecutorial Decisionmaking: Some Lessons of Cognitive Science, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1587,
1624-25 (2006).
16
See, e.g., Gabriel Lerner, How Teaching Political and Ethical Theory Could
Help Solve Two of the Legal Profession’s Biggest Problems, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 781, 783 (2006) (noting that “there is often a dissonance (or at least a
perceived dissonance) between how a human being should ethically behave and
how a lawyer should ethically behave” and that “[m]ost people want to be
decent human beings, yet lawyers, if they make their clients’ interests the
highest priority, must frequently do things, such as impugn the character of a
truthful witness, that would be reprehensible if done by a non-lawyer”).
17
See supra note 15.
18
See Dan M. Kahan, “Ideology in” or “Cultural Cognition of” Judging: What
Difference Does It Make?, 92 MARQ. L. REV. 413, 417 (2009) (noting that
judges might “sincerely bas[e] their decisions on their views of the law” but that
what they understand the law to require might be “shaped by their values -operating not as resources for theorizing law, but as subconscious, extralegal
influences on their perception of legally consequential facts”).
19
See id.
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lest the distinction between law and politics vanish. The source of
this counterbalance can either be internal or external to the
judiciary.20 The few external constraints on a sitting federal
judge’s discretion are, by design, notoriously weak21 and are in any
event better adapted to remedy outrageous, self-conscious abuses
of the judicial role and provide little incentive for a judge to be
rigorously self-critical about her own motives and assessments.22
The principle internal constraint grows out the judge’s desire to be
perceived by her judicial colleagues, the practicing bar, and,
perhaps to a lesser extent, the general public as consummate in the
judicial role.23 This desire in turn pushes a judge to strive to root
out and resist unconscious biases and assumptions in constitutional
cases only to the extent these three communities, and especially the
first, believe in and prize preservation of a distinction between
constitutional law and politics.
Judges no less than anyone else exhibit their commitments
through their actions. A judge’s exercise of constitutional
20

For a discussion of the distinction between internal and external constraints on
judges, see Michael J. Gerhardt, How a Judge Thinks, 93 MINN. L. REV. 2185,
2196-97 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK (2008)).
21
See Richard A. Albert, The Constitutional Imbalance, 37 N.M. L. REV. 1, 10
(2007) (noting that federal judges are “sheltered from removal (except through
the extraordinary act of impeachment) by the gift of life tenure, buoyed in their
words and actions by an indulgent theory of judicial independence, and freed
from the solemn commitment to popular accountability” and that “[w]hen
coupled with these emoluments, the mighty pen that judges wield without
popular review becomes perhaps the most powerful instrument controlled by
any public body in civil society”).
22
Cf. Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32,
42 (2005) (discussing external constraints on the Court and concluding that
“[t]here are political limits on what the Court can do, but they are capacious”).
23
See Jonathan T. Molot, Principled Minimalism: Restriking the Balance
Between Judicial Minimalism and Neutral Principles, 90 VA. L. REV. 1753,
1796 (2004) (observing that “[t]o the extent that judges care about their prestige
and power--and truly want to earn the respect of their colleagues and the legal
community generally--it is crucial that they be perceived to base their decisions
on the law” and that the “prospect of public exposure, criticism, and reputational
harm are among the most powerful forces that lead judges to ground their
decisions in existing legal materials”).
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forbearance exhibits her belief in and dedication to a separation of
constitutional law and her personal political predilections. As
such, instances of judicial forbearance can over time reinforce
forbearance as a norm governing judicial behavior.24 Moreover, a
commitment to forbearance depends on a faith that one’s judicial
colleagues both share and rigorously pursue this same virtue.25
Each judicial act of forbearance is in this sense a unilateral step in
a longer sequence aimed at achieving multi-lateral judicial
disarmament.26 Of course, in a similar fashion departures from the
norm weaken it.27 Law is a socially constructed reality, the
meaning and significance of which is forever in the process of
regeneration.28 In order for there to be any law in constitutional
law there must be, among other things, patterns of mutually
reinforcing judicial behavior that at once make judges be and look
like something other than politicians in robes.
It bears emphasis that the value of constitutional
forbearance is not merely a matter of perception. As Brian
Tamanaha has observed:
[I]deals have the potential to create a reality in their
image only so long as they are believed in and acted
pursuant to. This might sound fanciful, like
suggesting that something can be conjured up by
24

Cf. BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, LAW AS A MEANS TO AN END: THREAT TO THE RULE
LAW 236 (2006) (noting that the “threat to the rule of law is not that judges are
incapable of rendering decisions in an objective fashion” but rather that they
“come to believe that it cannot be done, or that most fellow judges are not doing
it”) (emphasis in original).
25
See id. (identifying as a serious threat to the rule of law a judicial skepticism
about the dedication of one’s colleagues to following the law).
26
Cf. Linda R. Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency
Action: A Rational Choice Theory and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV.
431, 474-475 (1996) (illustrating through game theory and through other
empirical evidence that courts, and especially the Supreme Court, employ
forbearance in situations where it assists their political or ideological goals).
27
See TAMANAHA, supra note 24, at 236.
28
See id. at 5-6.
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wishful thinking; or it might sound elitist, like the
“noble lie,” the idea that it is sometimes better for
the masses to believe in myths because the truth is
too much to handle. But it is neither. It is a routine
application of the proposition widely accepted
among social theorists and social scientists that
much of social reality is the construction of our
ideas and beliefs.29
So constitutional forbearance not only leads to a firmer faith in a
distinction between constitutional law and politics but also both
reflects and reinforces the truth of that faith.
B. The Analytical Contribution of Forbearance
What difference ought these considerations make in the
actual practice of the judicial craft?
None in most cases; a lot in a few. Since the ultimate
objective is to cabin the influence a judge’s personal policy
preferences have on the outcome of the cases she decides, most
often the wisest course is for the judge to pretend like those
preferences do not exist.30 Of course, this is precisely what, at
least superficially, judges do all the time.31 But judges no less than
the rest of us are irreducibly political creatures, and their politics
29

Id.
Justice Frankfurter spoke of himself, albeit some have charged hypocrtically,
as a “politcal eunuch,” an arresting metaphor. See BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, THE
TWICE-TOLD TALE OF MR. FIX-IT:REFLECTIONS ON THE BRANDEIS
FRANKFURTER CONNECTION 9 (1982).
31
For example Judge Vinson began his opinion striking down the ACA by
stating “this case is not about whether the Act is wise or unwise legislation, or
whether it will solve or exacerbate the myriad problems in our health care
system.” Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Serv., No.
3:10-cv-91, 2011 WL 285683, at *1 (N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2011); see also Virginia
ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768, 780 (E.D. Va. 2010) (calling
the government’s goal of expanding health care “laudable” but ultimately
concluding that the scheme is unconstitutional).
30
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necessarily manifest themselves as subtle biases in their perception
of both law and fact.32 Ignoring these influences will not make
them go away.33 What we can expect judges to do, however, is be
aware of their preferences and resist their gravitational pull.34
It would be as inappropriate as it is unlikely were this
resistance to manifest itself as hostility to one’s preferred
outcomes. Applied rigorously, such an approach would produce a
perverse anti-bias-bias that would work a distortion in legal
process that amounts to a mirror-image of the slant it was adopted
to cure. And this corruption would not even provide the benefit of
desirable (in the judge’s eyes) outcomes in individual cases. In the
vast majority of cases, a good judge, like a good umpire,35 has to
“call them as she sees them,” without any weight accorded either
the home team or the visitors.36
But awareness of the value of constitutional forbearance
should pull a judge ever so slightly towards an occasion of its
exercise. The force of this attraction would have to be minimal in
magnitude to avoid the absurd perversity outlined above.
Therefore in the vast run of cases this attraction would have no

32

See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
Cf. Dan M. Kahan & David A. Hoffman, Whose Eyes Are You Going to
Believe?: Scott v. Harris and the Perils of Cognitive Illiberalism, 122 HARV. L.
REV. 837, 895-98 (2009) (urging judges to identify culturally determined
heuristic biases and take steps to minimize their impact).
34
Id.de
35
For likely the most notorious recent use of this analogy, see the statement of
Chief Justice Roberts at his Senate confirmation hearing. See Confirmation
Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the
United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55
(2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
36
See id. at 448 (answer of John G. Roberts, Jr. to question posed by Sen.
Richard Durbin) (“I had someone ask me in this process . . . ‘Are you going to
be on the side of the little guy?’ And you obviously want to give an immediate
answer, but as you reflect on it, if the Constitution says that the little guy should
win, the little guy is going to win in court before me. But if the Constitution
says that the big guy should win, well, then, the big guy is going to win, because
my obligation is to the Constitution.”).
33
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effect.
In a narrow set of highly politicized and deeply
indeterminate cases, however, it should be decisive.
The strength of the typically minimal attraction towards
forbearance should grow as a particular case becomes more
politicized.37 This correlation makes sense for two reasons. First,
as the politicization of a case increases, so does the temptation a
judge might feel to give reign to his personal political
predilections. After all, the politicization of the case reflects
among other things the extent to which persons not party to the suit
will be affected by and care about its resolution.38 The more
widespread the interest in the ruling, the more likely is the judge to
be distracted by that interest.39 As the risk of cognitive bias
increases, so must the force set in opposition to it, at least it if it is
expected to have the desired effect. Second, as a case becomes
increasingly politicized, the risk that others will perceive, correctly
or not, a ruling to be politically motivated likewise increases.40
Though the point of forbearance is not solely or even primarily
about professional and public perceptions, they do matter. 41
Also important is the degree to which the relevant
constitutional law is settled and relatively clearly dictates a result
in the case. Even when at its zenith, the draw of forbearance
should not be strong enough to displace a settled legal rule. The
37

There is, of course, no scientific metric by which one can measure the extent
to which a case has been excessively politicized. One can, however, point to
indicia that a particular suit or issue has been politicized. Those indicia and
their relevance to the ACA cases is discussed at infra notes 171-219 and
accompanying text.
38
Cf. Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby, Notice-and-Comment Judicial
Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 974-84 (2009) (discussing the
enormous significance of some judicial opinions for persons not party to the
suit).
39
See Nelson Lund & John O. McGinnis, Lawrence v. Texas and Judicial
Hubris, 102 MICH. L. REV. 1555, 1605-06 (2004) (“In cases of high political
salience [] judges are most in need of guidance from the Constitution because
these are the cases where their raw personal preferences are most likely to
distort the judicial norm of dispassionate analysis.”).
40
See id.
41
See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
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whole point of forbearance is to strengthen rule of law values, so it
would make no sense to compromise them in its service. But as is
developed below,42 modern constitutional law is hardly
mathematical in its precision. Moreover, even within the realm of
constitutional law, there are areas that are more or less rule-bound
than others. And in those cases where the traditional tools of
constitutional analysis -- constitutional text, history, precedent -leave the judge with little direction and much discretion, even the
ordinarily negligible pull towards forbearance should be enough to
move the needle and resolve the controversy.
At least that is the theory of judicial virtue underlying this
essay. But how has this theory been reflected in actual practice?
A historical example supplies concrete detail to an otherwise
hopelessly abstract discussion at the same time it might provide
some defense to the charge naïveté.
C. The Ghost of Forbearance Past
History has not been kind to Justice James Clark
McReynolds, and for good reason.43 But his unfortunate, even
unforgivable, bigotry and boorish behavior ought not obscure his
virtues as a judge, the chief of which was an unwavering
dedication to constitutional duty as he perceived it. On at least two
historic occasions, this dedication trumped his strong personal
predilections to his enduring credit.
The first was the product of his belief that the Fourteenth
Amendment protected a core sphere of individual autonomy from
regulatory infringement. This belief was notoriously manifest in
his much-maligned adherence to economic substantive due process
well past what in retrospect can clearly be seen as the doctrine’s

42

See infra note 117 and accompanying text.
See generally JAMES E. BOND, I DISSENT: THE LEGACY OF CHIEF JUSTICE
JAMES CLARK MCREYNOLDS (1992).
43
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expiration date.44 He is less well remembered for his faithful
adherence to these principles in non-economic contexts on behalf
of a then-widely vilified ethnic minority. While the following
passage from the Court’s opinion in Meyer v. Nebraska is oftquoted, it is rarely noted that McReynolds was its author:
While this court has not attempted to define with
exactness the liberty thus guaranteed, the term has
received much consideration and some of the
included things have been definitely stated. Without
doubt, it denotes not merely freedom from bodily
restraint but also the right of the individual to
contract, to engage in any of the common
occupations of life, to acquire useful knowledge, to
marry, establish a home and bring up children, to
worship God according to the dictates of his own
conscience, and generally to enjoy those privileges
long recognized at common law as essential to the
orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.45
Still, the context of the ruling is even less often recalled. At the
height of the anti-German hysteria following U.S. entry into the
First World War, Nebraska, likely many states enacted laws that
prohibited the teaching of any modern language other than
English.46 McReynolds was far from immune from the kind of
vehement passions that led to these enactments. Indeed, two years
earlier, in a notorious dissent from the Court’s reversal of two
German-Americans espionage convictions, McReynolds defended
the trial courts apparent anti-German prejudice as reasonable and

44

See, e.g., Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 539 (1934) (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting); Gold Cases, 294 U.S. 240, 317 (1935) ((McReynolds, J.,
dissenting).
45
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
46
William G. Ross, A Judicial Janus: Meyer v. Nebraska in Historical
Perspective, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 125 (1988).
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justified in the light of recent, common experience.47 But he was
able to bridle these passions in Meyer and vindicate a broad
conception of individual liberty, over a dissent by Justice Holmes.
In doing so, McReynolds led the Court to an exemplary, and
praiseworthy, act of constitutional forbearance.
Nor was this a singular episode in McReynolds’s long
judicial career. He alone exhibited impressive forbearance in
service of constitutional principle when confronted with the federal
government’s first volley in the now century-old “war on drugs.”
Within ten years of the New York legislature’s enactment of one of
the nation’s first major narcotics laws, Congress passed the
revealingly labeled Harrison Anti-Narcotic Act of 1914. The
Court construed the Act broadly to supplant any contrary state law
and impose a nationwide blanket prohibition on the sale of
narcotics, to be enforced with severe criminal penalties, excepting
only that distribution the Treasury Department (and the Court)
deemed to be “in the regular course of the professional practice of
medicine.”48 Then in United States v. Doremus the Court rebuffed
the claim that the Act, so construed, exceeded Congress’s power to
tax. Justice Day’s opinion reasoned that the Act was within the
ambit of congressional authority so long as it had “some
reasonable relation” to the raising of revenue, even if the law’s
“effect [was] to accomplish another purpose as well.”49 Courts
were not to inquire into congressional motives.50 Applying these
precepts, Justice Day eagerly endorsed the fiction that the
regulatory character of the Harrison Act was merely incidental to
its revenue raising function manifested solely in the statute’s
47

See Berger v. United States, 255 U.S. 22, 42-43 (1921) (McReynolds, J.,
dissenting). See generally PEGGY COOPER DAVIS, NEGLECTED STORIES: THE
CONSTITUTION AND FAMILY VALUES 87-90 (1997) (discussing McReynolds’s
hostility to Germans).
48
United States v. Doremus, 246 F. 958, 959 (W.D. Tex. 1918) (quoting
indictment), rev’d, 249 U.S. 86 (1919).
49
United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 94 (1919).
50
Id. at 93 (“[F]rom an early day the Court has held that the fact that other
motives may impel the exercise of federal taxing power does not authorize the
courts to inquire into that subject.”).
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imposition of a nominal $1 per annum tax. Four Justices,
including McReynolds, dissented.
Judicial deference to claimed congressional purposes may
be defensible, indeed even laudable, in light of the relative
institutional competence and legitimacy of these two branches of
the national government. But selective deference is, of course, not
deference at all but rather merely a disguise for inchoate judicial
policy judgments avowedly the province of the legislature. And in
The Child Labor Tax Case,51 the Court selectively abandoned the
posture of deference it had assumed in Doremus in favor of its
perceived obligation to assess independently whether the
challenged law “impose[d] a tax with only that incidental restraint
and regulation which a tax must inevitably involve” or whether the
statute “regulate[d] by the use of the so-called tax as a penalty.” 52
Justice McReynolds was, appropriately, troubled by the
Court’s inconsistency on federalism. In his opinion for a
unanimous Court in United States v. Daugherty,53 he welcomed,
indeed outlined, an argument that Doremus be overruled:
The constitutionality of the [Harrison] Anti Narcotic
Act, touching which this court so sharply divided in
United States v. Doremus, was not raised below, and
has not been again considered. The doctrine approved
in Hammer v. Dagenhart, The Child Labor Tax Case,
51

Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (The Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20
(1922).
52
Id. at 36. Taft’s opinion for the Court identified only one difference between
the two statutes. Whereas the Child Labor Tax Law was “on the face of the act
[a] penalty,” any ulterior motive that may have contributed to the passage of the
narcotics law was “not shown on [its] face.” Id. at 39, 43. But even that alleged
difference ignored the unanswered conclusion of the Doremus trial court and
four Supreme Court dissenters that the terms of the Harrison Act standing alone
revealed that the law’s actual purpose was narcotics regulation, not revenue
collection. See generally A. Christopher Bryant, The Third Death of
Federalism, 17 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 101, 109-10 (2007) (discussing the
Harrison Act cases).
53
269 U.S. 360 (1926).
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[] and Linder v. United States, may necessitate a
review of that question, if hereafter properly
presented.54
But a majority of the Justices were content to allow Congress to
exercise what in effect amounted to a general police power so long
as the power was discharged against conduct the Justices
themselves found abhorrent. When the issue finally returned in
Nigro v. United States,55 the Court reaffirmed the constitutionality
of the Harrison Act.
In his opinion for the Court, Chief Justice Taft first adopted
the government’s broad interpretation of the Act, which in effect
criminalized receipt of the covered narcotics by anyone absent a
physician’s lawful prescription for an approved medicinal use.56
So interpreted, the Act fairly obviously constituted a spurious use
of the taxing power to prohibit private conduct deemed dangerous
and immoral, a responsibility not entrusted by the Constitution’s
enumerated powers to the federal government but rather one
reserved to the states. In form, at least, Chief Justice Taft agreed
that the federal government lacked any such power.57 Taft
nevertheless upheld the Act on the transparent fiction that its strict
constraints on both those who might sell and those who might buy
narcotics were merely incidental to tax collection.58 It was as if
Congress prohibited the sale of all alcoholic beverages in order to
ensure that distributors paid the excise tax on alcohol sales. Taft
54

Id. at 362-63. (citations omitted).
276 U.S. 332 (1928). That decision addressed and resolved a series of
questions that the Eighth Circuit had, in a now-extinct procedure, certified for
Supreme Court consideration.
56
Id. at 344.
57
Early in his analysis, he avowed that “[i]n interpreting the act, we must
assume that it is a taxing measure, for otherwise it would be no law at all. If it is
a mere act for the purpose of regulating and restraining the purchase of the
opiate and other drugs, it is beyond the power of Congress, and must be
regarded as invalid, just as the Child Labor Act of Congress was held to be.” Id.
at 341 (citing Bailey, Collector, v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U. S. 20 (1922)).
58
Nigro, 276 U.S. at 353-54.
55
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justified congressional elimination of the non-medicinal narcotics
market as a means of ensuring that the distributors in that market
paid their registration fees. The surgery was a success, but the
patient died.
McReynolds must have been sympathetic with the policy of
narcotics prohibition, likely for reasons both righteous and
ignoble.59 But he declined to join in the Court’s willful blindness.
In his dissent, he acknowledged what must have been obvious to
everyone, namely that Congress’s “plain intent [was] to control the
traffic within the States by preventing sales except to registered
persons and holders of prescriptions,” a bald usurpation of the
police power reserved to the States.60 Thus, unlike most of his
colleagues,61 McReynolds resisted the temptation to honor
federalism in the breach in service of the apparently worthy causes
of preventing addition and preserving traditional mores, causes in
which he must have wholeheartedly believed. In so doing, he
again demonstrated admirable fortitude, exemplified judicial
forbearance, and exhibited a distinction between constitutional law
and politics. As explained below, the challenge to the individual
health-insurance mandate provides sitting judges with an
unparalleled opportunity to follow his example.

II. A Time Ripe for Forbearance
Rarely has the need for constitutional forbearance been
more acute than it is today. The very possibility of a meaningful
distinction between law and politics is dismissed as naive by
59

McReynolds expressly acknowledged the “evils incident to the use of opium.”
Nigro, 276 U.S. at 357 (McReynolds, J., dissenting). For a discussion of
McReynolds’s antipathy for unorthodox persons and conduct, see generally
BOND, supra note 43, at 124-26 & 136.
60
Nigro, 276 U.S. at 356 (McReynolds, J., dissenting).
61
Justice Sutherland joined Justice McReynolds’s dissent. Id. at 356. Justice
Butler dissented on the ground that he would have rejected the government’s
broad construction of the Act and, thereby, avoided the constitutional question.
Id. at 357-58 (Butler, J., dissenting).
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some.62 To those truly hardened into this skepticism, this essay
has little to say. Many others, however, hold out hope in the
possibility of this demarcation, while at the same time their doubts
grow about current federal judges’ and justices’ commitment to
achieving it.63
To be sure, this problem has been long in the making. One
of the central, recurring questions of twentieth-century American
history was what role judicial review ought to play in the nation’s
political and social life. A mere five years into the century, a
divided Supreme Court asserted the power and duty to scrutinize
regulations of the terms of labor contracts, then an emerging trend
in the wake of industrialization, in the name of common law rights
to which the Court had accorded constitutional status.64 Of course
the resulting economic substantive due process jurisprudence,
when joined with inconstant efforts to limit Congress to a strict
reading of its enumerated powers,65 ultimately provoked a singular
constitutional crisis in which the Court first resisted and then
succumbed to concentrated pressure from Congress and the
President.66 During this same period legal theory underwent
momentous change, as a nineteenth-century faith in natural law
and legal science was replaced with legal realism’s emphasis on
the inevitable choices judges make in deciding cases, even when
purporting to do so according to an apparently mechanistic
application of legal rules. Some realists went so far as to contest
the power of law to provide any constraint on raw judicial will.67
Other, however, more moderate critics sustained a faith in law’s
capacity to constrain at the same time they stressed that some
62

See TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 235-44 (discussing and critiquing this
view).
63
See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 9, at 587.
64
See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
65
See generally Bryant, supra note 52.
66
See generally THOMAS B. MCAFFEE, ET AL., POWERS RESERVED FOR THE
STATES AND THE PEOPLE: A HISTORY OF THE NINTH AND TENTH AMENDMENTS
143-61 (2006)
67
See TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 235.
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judgments about matters of public policy were an unavoidable
aspect of judging.68
The Court’s ill-fated New Deal Era confrontation with the
political branches was soon explained as the wages of the judicial
sin of hubris. The Court had conflated its legitimate role in
enforcing fundamental law with an illegitimate resistance to the
politically unfamiliar.69 The lesson widely drawn from the clash
and the Court’s ensuing retreat was that the Court was poorly
situated and ill-equipped to second guess the inevitable
compromises embodied in social and economic legislation.70 At
the same time, the Court asserted the possibility of a more active
role in the protection of “discrete and insular minorities,” who
might be unable to protect themselves in the legislative arena.71
Thus at the heart of American jurisprudence in the first decades of
the last century was a hard-earned skepticism about a distinction
between law, especially constitutional law, and politics.
The Court’s reservation of a theoretical right to intervene
on behalf of minorities became a reality with the Court’s 1954
invalidation of public-school segregation in Brown v. Board of
Education,72 the pre-eminent legal event of the century. A former
governor of California, Chief Justice Warren wrote for a
unanimous Court, which dismissed the historical record of the
Fourteenth Amendment as “at best, . . . inconclusive,”73 and
proceeded with a highly contextualized and pragmatic discussion
of the contemporary importance of education and the
psychological harms of segregation.74 Though Warren’s opinion
68

See Id., at 235-38.
See generally ROBERT H. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY: A STUDY OF A CRISIS IN AMERICAN POWER POLITICS (1941).
70
See United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 U.S. 144, 151 (1938)
(affording significant deference to the legislature in making economic decisions
about the safety of shipping certain types of milk across states lines).
71
Id. at n.4.
72
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
73
Id. at 489.
74
Id. at 491 n.11 (citing psychological studies that show segregation led to
inferiority complexes among black schoolchildren).
69
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rested on the uniqueness of education, the Court in short order and
by a series of laconic per curiam opinions extended the
constitutional prohibition on segregation to buses, public beaches,
and municipal golf courses.75 All this left some legal liberals
pleased with these patently noble outcomes but worried about their
legality. Most famously, and to many infamously, Professor
Herbert Wechsler pondered publicly whether the cases, whose
results he applauded, could be squared with a commitment to any
“neutral principles” of constitutional law.76
Of course this same skepticism has dogged the Court and
its students ever since, waxing and waning according to the
controversy created by the Court’s decisions. But there is reason
to believe that the issue has recently grown in prominence and that
another crisis in confidence may be at hand. To be sure, the
twentieth century was a harrowing time for those who believe that
constitutional law can and should be something more than just
politics. But so far the twenty-first century has been even worse.
In this regard the decade got off to a terrible start when
five conservative Justices embraced a novel equal protection
argument in the service of resolving, in their favor, the deep and
enduring dispute over the 2000 presidential election.77 As bad as
this was, it was further exacerbated by the remarkably partisan
response of the legal academy.78 Steven Calabresi was in splendid
isolation as the sole demonstrably conservative legal scholar who
challenged the validity of what the Court had done.79
75

See Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S 903 (1956) (buses); Holmes v. City of Atlanta,
350 U.S 879 (1955) (municipal golf courses); Mayor of Baltimore v. Dawson,
350 U.S. 877 (1955) (public beaches).
76
Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73
HARV. L. REV. 1, 17 (1959).
77
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
78
See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Bush v. Gore: Looking at Baker v. Carr in a
Conservative Mirror, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 359, 386 (2001) (noting that “the
voluminous commentary on Bush v. Gore [] mirrored the Court’s ideological
split”).
79
See id.; see also Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Does Congress Have the Constitutional
Power to Prohibit Partial-Birth Abortion, 42 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 319, 342
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But this was only the beginning. After one relatively quiet
term, the Court in June 2003 splintered over two of the more
divisive political issues of the day -- homosexuality80 and
affirmative action.81 In both instances, the opinions for the Court
said relatively little about constitutional text, ratification-era
history, or precedent, not surprisingly as these traditional tools of
constitutional law either shed little light on the matter or
affirmatively contradicted the majority’s resolution of the issue.82
Not surprisingly, the cases provoked unusually lengthy and
passionate dissents.83 As with Bush v. Gore,84 the academic
response was similarly polarized and apparently aligned with the
authorial ideology.85
In June 2005, the Court handed down two rulings that,
rather bizarrely, approved a public display of the Ten
Commandments in Texas but disallowed the same in Kentucky.86
Only one Justice saw any difference between the two cases, but
given the conflict on the Court concerning its Establishment
Clause jurisprudence, that was sufficient for different results.87
Then, without overruling its 2000 decision invalidating Nebraska’s
(2005) (citing Calabresi as a prominent conservative who criticized Bush v.
Gore).
80
See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
81
See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
82
Of course, Lawrence expressly overruled the precedent most clearly on point.
See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (overruling Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186
(1986)). In Grutter both the majority and the dissent claimed the advantage of
precedent. Compare Grutter, 539 U.S. at 322, with id. at 379-80 (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting).
83
See, e.g., Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 583 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Grutter, 539 U.S.
at 349 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
84
531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
85
Compare, e.g., Pamela S. Karlan, Loving Lawrence, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1447
(2004), with Lino A. Graglia, Lawrence v. Texas: Our Philospher-kings Adopt
Libertarianism as our Official National Philosophy and Reject Traditional
Morality as the Basis for Law, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1139 (2004).
86
Compare Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005), with McCreary County v.
ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
87
See supra note 86.
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ban on so-called “partial-birth” abortions,88 seven years and two
new Justices later the Court sustained a remarkably similar federal
law.89 The academic response was largely one of shock and
incredulity.90
Later that same term, the Justices fought fiercely over the
rightful legacy of Brown v. Bd. of Ed..91 In Parents Involved in
Community Schools v. Seattle School District,92 the Court, via a
plurality opinion by the Chief Justice, invalidated race-based pupil
assignment regimes in two public school systems. Circling Justice
Kennedy’s decisive but vague concurrence in the result,93 the
plurality and the dissents accused one another of disrespecting the
true meaning of the half-century-old canonical case.94 Justice
Stevens took the extraordinary step of ending his dissent with the
pointed declaration that
The Court has changed significantly [in the three
previous decades]. It was then more faithful to
Brown and more respectful of our precedent than it
is today. It is my firm conviction that no Member
of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have agreed
with today’s decision.95

88

Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
90
See Pushaw, supra note 9, at 567 (asserting that “[m]ost commentators agreed
that Gonzales took a large step in the direction of eventually overruling Roe”
and that “[p]ro-choice advocates viewed this development with trepidation,
while pro-life supporters welcomed it”).
91
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
92
551 U.S. 701 (2007).
93
Id. at 782 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
94
Compare id. at 746 (plurality) (“when it comes to using race to assign children
to schools, history will be heard”), with id. at 868 (Breyer, J., dissenting)
(asserting that “[t]o invalidate the plans under review is to threaten the promise
of Brown”).
95
Id. at 803 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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While this claim can be read different ways, it certainly calls into
question the current Court’s institutional dedication to the rule of
law.
In June 2008, in what was perhaps its most
jurisprudentially significant ruling of the decade, the Court went
bitterly into the final frontier of constitutional interpretation -- the
Second Amendment. In District of Columbia v. Heller,96 a bare
five-Justice majority concluded that the Amendment protected an
individual right and invalidated the District’s handgun ban. The
case stimulated intense passions, both on and off the Court, in the
latter context even among such stalwart conservatives as Judges
Wilkinson and Posner.97 Critics accused the Court’s conservative
members of precisely the sort of judicial activism they had long
reviled when in dissent.98 Of course these tensions were inflamed
anew when the Court, again in a 5-4 ruling, extended the rule of
Heller to state and local governments.99
The Court had hardly avoided political controversy in the
meantime. In February 2010 the Court decided Citizens United v.
FEC,100 which expressly overruled one precedent and part of
another on the way to invalidating the 2002 federal statutory
restrictions on corporation and union expenditures for speech
calculated to influence imminent federal elections.101 Justice
Stevens, writing one of the last dissents of his career, was nearly
apoplectic.102 The case earned President Obama’s rebuke in his
96

128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
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See Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness: The Supreme Court and Gun
Control, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, available at
http://www.tnr.com/article/books/defense-looseness; J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of
Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling of the Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253
(2009).
98
See supra note 97.
99
130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
100
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct 876 (2010).
101
Id.
102
Id. at 931 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s ruling threatens to
undermine the integrity of elected institutions across the Nation.”).
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first State of the Union address, which in turn provoked a much
ballyhooed inaudible but unmistakable “not true” from the
attending Justice Alito.103
The ruling was extraordinarily
104
unpopular, and was perceived by many as at best naive and at
worst in the partisan service of the Republican party, which likely
had the most to gain from virtually unlimited corporate spending in
federal elections.105 The timing of the ruling maximized its effect
on the 2010 congressional elections,106 and the decision may have
played a role in last fall’s Republican resurgence.
One need not conclude that all, or even any, of these cases
were wrongly decided to recognize that the cumulative effect of so
many sharply divided rulings on some of the most politically
divisive issues of our time is to further politicize the Court and
constitutional law. Indeed, commentators representing a wide
array perspectives have so noted. Judge Posner devoted the unique
opportunity afforded by his Harvard Law Review “Foreword” to
explaining in mathematical and merciless detail why he had
concluded that the Supreme Court was “A Political Court.”107
Conservative scholars have long decried the Court’s politicization
of constitutional law.108 And the experience of first the Rehnquist
103

See Shannen W. Coffin, “Not True” – With its Citizens United Decision, the
Supreme Court Struck a Blow for Freedom of Speech, NATIONAL REVIEW, Feb.
22, 2010, at 12.
104
See Richard L. Hasen, Op-Ed., Is it All About Scalia, PITT. POST-GAZETTE,
April 15, 2010, at B7.
105
See Dan Eggen & Ben Pershing, Democrats Scramble After Campaign
Ruling, Corporate Purse Strings May Be Tough to Tighten as Midterms
Approach, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 2010, at A1.
106
See High Court Ruling Leaves States Scrambling to Close Gaps on Spending
Limits, BOSTON GLOBE, Mar. 21, 2010, at 12; Court Ruling on Election
Spending Expected, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 21, 2010, at 2; Eggen & Pershing,
supra note 105, at A1.
107
Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 32
(2005). To be sure, he thought this state of affairs to some extent inevitable, but
he also urged a more “modest” approach than had prevailed in recent rulings.
Id. at 54-60.
108
See, e.g., RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (2d ed. 1997). See also
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and now the Roberts Courts has provoked similar protests from
more liberal quarters.109
It would take far more space than the essay format allows
to thoroughly canvass just the relatively recent legal literature
decrying the politicization of the modern Supreme Court and
modern constitutional law, so the rather random sampling set forth
in the notes will have to suffice. But one principle should emerge
from any fair overview, however cursory, and that is that this
frustration is not limited to any part of the political spectrum.110
Rather there is a consensus emerging from all quarters that it is
increasingly difficult to take modern constitutional law, at least as
articulated by the Supreme Court, all that seriously.111 Even Brian
Tamanaha, whose refreshing call upon the profession and
especially the legal academy to recover a “more balanced realism”
in no small part inspired the present piece writes off constitutional
law as a lost cause.112
Not surprisingly the growing equation of constitutional law
with raw political will has worked an increasing corruption of the
process for nominating and confirming federal judges, most
acutely at the federal courts of appeals level.113 Of course the
Pushaw, supra note , at (collecting examples); Michael Stokes Paulsen,
Abrogating Stare Decisis by Statute: May Congress Remove the Precedential
Effect of Roe and Casey?, 109 YALE L.J. 1535, 1538 n.6, 1539 & n.9 (2000)
(citing articles attacking Casey as an unprincipled surrender to political
expedience).
109
See, e.g., Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Understanding the
Constitutional Revolution, 87 VA. L. REV. 1045 (2001); William P. Marshall,
Conservatives and the Seven Sins of Judicial Activism, 73 U. COLO. L. REV.
1217 (2002). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Tilting the Scales Rightward, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 26, 2001, at A23.
110
Compare supra note 108, with supra note 109.
111
See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 90, at 527 (describing a “decades-long
movement that has rendered the process and substance of constitutional decision
making almost indistinguishable from simple politics”).
112
See TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 164.
113
See, e.g., Pushaw, supra note 90, at 588 (“Not surprisingly, the merger of
constitutional law with raw politics has corrupted the judicial appointment
process, especially at the Supreme Court level.”). To be sure, the problem is not
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Supreme Court appointment process has not been immune from
this corruption.114 Finally, the ACA cases themselves reflect the
acuteness of the present need for constitutional forbearance. The
public reaction to them has generally assumed that the division
among the lower courts is explainable by the judges’ various
partisan sympathies and that this division will continue as the cases
progress up the federal judicial latter.115

III. “Obamacare” As Constitutional Opportunity
The foregoing history of constitutional forbearance and the
acuteness of the present need for more of the same provide a
context for fully appreciating the potentially enormous, long-term
significance of judicial rulings on the constitutionality of the
individual health insurance mandate. Sadly, the possibility of
judicial unanimity is already behind us. But even so, an
extraordinary opportunity both to conjure and illustrate a
separation between our constitutional law and our politics remains.
It is the opportunity for the exercise of constitutional forbearance.
This part both identifies some of the reasons this is true and
explores ways in which that opportunity might be fulfilled or
squandered.
A. CONSTITUTIONAL INDETERMINACY
The central substantive constitutional issue raised in the
litigation concerning the ACA is whether the Commerce Clause,
alone or as aided by the Necessary and Proper Clause, grants
Congress power to enact the health insurance individual

a new one. See generally STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS:
CLEANING UP THE FEDERAL APPOINTMENTS PROCESS (1994).
114
See TAMANAHA, supra note 29, at 181-84; see also supra note 113.
115
See infra note 219 and accompanying text.
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mandate.116 One would be hard pressed to find an area of the law
more notoriously indeterminate and subject to political
manipulation than the Court’s current Commerce Clause
jurisprudence, which one leading commentator has declared
“analytical chaos.”117 Accordingly, any claim that a federal statute
“clearly” exceeds Congress’s power under these clauses ought to,
and ordinarily is, met with skepticism. Moreover, this claim is
unusually untenable when made with respect to the ACA’s
individual mandate.
1.

The Case for Congressional Power

All agree that the federal government is one of enumerated
and therefore limited powers.118 Two clauses in Article I, section 8
are most obviously relevant to the question whether Congress has
the power to enact the individual mandate. The first accords
Congress power “to regulate Commerce . . . Among the Several
States.”119 The second authorizes Congress to “to make all laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution”

116

See, e.g., Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, 720 F.Supp. 2d 882, 891-95
(E.D. Mich. 2010); Florida ex. rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dept. of Health and
Human Serv., 716 F.Supp. 2d 1120, 1162 (N.D. Fla. 2010).
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authority.”); Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, 728 F. Supp. 2d 768,
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its power over interstate commerce (and all other powers the
Constitution vests in the federal government).120
Considering first the congressional power to regulate
commerce, what is “Commerce” for these purposes? Whatever
may be the outer boundaries of this term, more than six decades
ago the Supreme Court held that the business of insurance was
“commerce” within the meaning of Article I, section 8. In United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n,121 the Court observed
that “[n]o commercial enterprise of any kind which conducts its
activities across state lines ha[d] been held to be wholly beyond the
regulatory power of Congress under the Commerce Clause” and
expressly declined the invitation to “make an exception of the
business of insurance.”122 As Harvard law professor and Reagan
Administration Solicitor General Charles Fried recently observed,
“the law has not departed from th[at] conclusion for a moment
since” this 1944 ruling.123
And although South-Eastern
Underwriters concerned fire insurance, nowhere in all the
Obamacare litigation’s voluminous filings is it contended that the
holding of that case does not extend to health insurance. Similarly,
all the litigants and jurists in these cases, however vigorously they
dispute other questions, are nevertheless in complete agreement
that the health insurance industry is one that bestrides state lines
like a colossus.
Once it is acknowledged that health insurance is interstate
“Commerce” within the meaning of the Commerce Clause,
Congress then enjoys plenary power, under well settled precedent,
to “prescribe the rule to govern” the conduct of that enterprise. As
Chief Justice Marshall wrote nearly two centuries ago, Congress’s
power under the Commerce Clause
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is the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the
rule by which commerce is to be governed. This
power, like all others vested in Congress, is
complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost
extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other
than are prescribed in the constitution. . . . . If,
as has always been understood, the sovereignty
of Congress, though limited to specified objects,
is plenary as to those objects, the power over
commerce . . . among the several States, is vested
in Congress as absolutely as it would be in a
single government, having in its constitution the
same restrictions on the exercise of the power as
are found in the constitution of the United
States.124
In short, Congress has the power to make the rules as to how the
health insurance business is to operate. The bookend requirements
that health insurers not refuse coverage to persons with preexisting conditions and that individuals not wait until there are sick
to apply for health insurance are rules governing the conduct of the
health insurance business, and therefore appear to be well within
the ambit of congressional authority. The case for congressional
power to enact the mandate is strikingly plain and straightforward,
far more so than the case for congressional power to enact
numerous other provisions in the U.S. code. The point is not that
the individual mandate is patently constitutional and all arguments
to the contrary border on frivolity, though to be sure several other
distinguished commentators have so concluded.125 For present
purposes it suffices to show, as the foregoing presentation has, that
the case for congressional power can be made under well settled
Supreme Court precedents. It hardly requires heavy lifting for a
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federal judge to sustain the constitutionality of the individual
mandate.
But even if there were a weak link hidden somewhere in
this chain of reasoning, an alternative argument independently
supports congressional power. For, even if the individual mandate
were not a regulation of commerce within the meaning of the
Commerce Clause, Congress would in any event have sufficient
power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to impose it. That
clause, among other things, grants Congress power to enact any
regulation, not otherwise prohibited by the Constitution, that can
be deemed “‘an essential part of a larger regulation of economic
activity.’”126 Put differently, “where Congress has the authority to
enact a regulation of interstate commerce, ‘it possesses every
power needed to make that regulation effective.’”127 This power
extends even to intrastate, non-economic matters.128 Furthermore,
in considering whether a non-economic, intrastate regulation is
“essential” to the success of a larger regulatory scheme, the Court
does not evaluate the relationship independently. Rather, “[t]he
relevant question is simply whether the means chosen are
reasonably adapted to the attainment of a legitimate end under the
commerce power.”129 It is sufficient that Congress “could
reasonably conclude”130 that its broader regulatory scheme would
be undercut absent the supplemental regulation of even a wholly
intrastate and non-economic matter.
With respect to the ACA’s individual mandate, it would be
difficult to conclude otherwise. The mandate was an indispensable
corollary to the Act’s most fundamental industry reform.
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A principal justification for the Act was that millions of
Americans lacked health insurance.131 Moreover, their number
was growing at an alarming rate.132 Many Americans had lost their
insurance after changing jobs.133 Because health insurance in the
U.S. has for decades been a benefit provided most permanent
employees, a change in employers frequently also meant a change
in health insurers. But health insurance companies increasingly
declined to insure persons with pre-existing conditions or offered
such persons coverage only at exorbitant rates.134 The growing
population of uninsured and practically uninsurable Americans
presented Congress with a compelling humanitarian dilemma.135
But Congress also confronted a severe threat to the long-term
health of the economy.136 The uninsurable were often therefore
practically unemployable and, in any event, were at grave risk of
bankruptcy and poverty.137 This economic dislocation, in addition
to imposing an awesome toll of human suffering, also produced
ripple effects throughout the broader economy. When joined with
the specter of exponentially increasing healthcare costs, the purely
economic consequences of the healthcare status quo ante required
131
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congressional action to prevent a crippling economic crisis. Or so
Congress reasonably concluded.138
Congress responded by, among other things, sharply
circumscribing the ability of insurance companies to deny
coverage or charge differential rates on the basis of applicants’ preexisting conditions.139 The power of Congress to impose these
restrictions on the multi-billion dollar, interstate health insurance
industry is beyond reasonable debate, and in fact has not even been
questioned in any of the cases challenging the constitutionality of
the ACA.140 But once one acknowledges congressional power to
enact these restrictions, then the power to enact the individual
mandate follows as night follows day. The prohibitions on insurer
discrimination against applicants with pre-existing conditions
would, if enacted alone, create a perverse incentive to defer
purchasing health insurance unless and until seriously ill.141
Health insurance would be only for the sick and the paranoid.
Hence, the Act’s requirement that most everybody buy health
insurance beginning in 2014. Even if the mandate cannot standing
alone be justified as a regulation of interstate commerce, and for
the reasons set forth above it likely can, it nonetheless is within
Congress’s independent power, under the Necessary and Proper
138
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Clause, to make its other regulations of Commerce (here, the
prohibitions on denying coverage because of an applicant’s preexisting conditions) effective.
These restrictions are precisely the kind of “regulatory
scheme that could be undercut”142 absent a health-insurance
mandate. Not only was it reasonable for Congress to conclude that
an ex ante mandate to purchase health insurance was essential to a
regulatory scheme that included ex post prohibitions on
discrimination against applicants because of pre-existing
conditions, but indeed this conclusion may have been the only
reasonable one.143 In any event, congressional concern that the
prohibitions on discrimination against applicants with pre-existing
conditions would endanger the private health insurance industry
absent a purchase mandate cannot be dismissed as unreasonable.
Once again, it is not necessary to conclude that this chain of
reasoning sweeps away all contrary considerations. But the
analysis should make clear that existing Commerce Clause
jurisprudence readily supplied the tools to build a case for the
ACA, including the individual mandate.
2.

The Case Against Congressional Power

How then to explain the fact that two federal judges have
held that the individual mandate exceeded congressional authority?
The case against the constitutionality of the Act depends upon a
distinction between activity and inactivity. The Act’s litigation
opponents have argued that the individual mandate regulates
inactivity, because it penalizes the individual for simply doing
142
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nothing.144 As the Act’s defenders have noted in response, given
the undeniable frailty of this mortal coil and existing practices
(including some legal requirements) that all those in our borders
and in dire need of medical care receive it, it is far from clear that
declining to purchase health insurance can really be characterized
as doing nothing.145 By failing to take the responsible step of
providing a means to pay for the potentially catastrophically
expensive care one may in the future need and receive, the
individual who foregoes health insurance in fact acts in reliance on
society as a form of insurance.146
Regardless, as interesting as these semantic distinctions
may be, it is ultimately unnecessary to resolve them to pass upon
the legal challenge to healthcare reform. Even if the individual
mandate is best understood as a regulation of inactivity, that does
not inevitably mean it is unconstitutional. The two decisions
striking down the requirement labeled such a regulation of
inactivity as “unprecedented.” To be sure, if that label is a fair
one147 this means that no controlling legal authority requires a
lower federal court to sustain the law against constitutional
challenge. But of course it likewise means that no controlling legal
authority dooms the law to invalidation.148 The truly disinterested
144
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judge would, in this worst case scenario for the law, be left in
equipoise, with little or no guidance as to how to resolve the
controversy. And as others have trenchantly observed, it is far
from clear why even inactivity that, when considered in context,
undermines a regulatory scheme crafted in response to a genuine
threat to the nation’s economic well being should be immune from
congressional authority.149
At its core, the case against the Act relies chiefly upon the
claim that a decision upholding the mandate will permit Congress
virtually unlimited authority under the Commerce Clause. It is
argued that if Congress can compel the individual to buy health
insurance, then Congress must also have to the power to compel
individuals to buy and even (gasp!) eat broccoli, or other noxiously
nutritious fare. The individual mandate is characterized as a first
step onto to a “slippery slope” that leads ineluctably to the demise
of the Constitution’s central design by which the federal
government was confined to enumerated, and therefore limited,
powers.
These arguments have rhetorical strength, which is why
they have prevailed in two of the five district courts to rule on the
constitutional issue. But upon closer examination they are less
than compelling. As an initial matter, contemporary claims about
threats to the enumerated powers scheme call urgently for closing
the barn door about seventy years after the horse escaped. In the
wake of the New Deal constitutional crisis, the Supreme Court
effectively abdicated any meaningful role in the enforcement of the
limits imposed upon Congress by the Constitution’s enumeration
of its powers.150 To be sure, the Courts decisions in United States
v. Lopez151 and United States v. Morrison152 kindled hopes of a
revival, albeit it a narrow one, of this judicial prerogative.
149
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But to whatever extent these hopes were reasonable, they
were dashed by the Court’s 2005 ruling in Raich v. Gonzales.153
There, the Rehnquist Court, in one of its final constitutional
decisions, recognized congressional authority to prohibit
possession of any amount of marijuana, anywhere in the United
States for any purpose, regardless of its source.154 In dissent,
Justice Thomas aptly characterized Raich as supplying yet another
epitaph for judicial enforcement of the enumerated powers scheme:
“Diane Monson and Angel Raich use marijuana that has never
been bought or sold, that has never crossed state lines, and that has
had no demonstrable effect on the national market for marijuana.
If Congress can regulate this under the Commerce Clause, then it
can regulate virtually anything -- and the Federal Government is no
longer one of limited and enumerated powers.”155 The Court’s
ruling in Raich cannot be dismissed as an isolated misstep. Rather,
Raich was part of a century-old pattern of conservative judges
marching forward federalism principles when Congress does
something they do not like, and then conveniently forgetting them
when Congress does something they do like.156 Of course a
selectively invoked federalism is, in fact, not federalism at all. It is
instead a tool for jurists to dismantle laws they do not like for other
reasons, leaving intact laws equally obnoxious to federalism
principles that they happen to believe salutary, empowering them

152

529 U.S. 598 (2000).
545 U.S. 1 (2005).
154
See generally id.
155
Id. at 34 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Justice Thomas added that according to the
majority’s opinion, “the Federal Government may now regulate quilting bees,
clothes drives, and potluck suppers throughout the 50 States. This makes a
mockery of Madison’s assurance to the people of New York that the ‘powers
delegated’ to the Federal Government are ‘few and defined,’ while those of the
States are ‘numerous and indefinite.’ One searches the Court's opinion in vain
for any hint of what aspect of American life is reserved to the States. Id. at 3435 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (J. Cooke ed.
1961).
156
See generally Bryant, supra note 52, at 101.
153

37

to pick and choose among federal statutes on a basis they never
need articulate let alone defend.
Even if that context were ignored, however, the claim that a
decision upholding the individual mandate would in turn become a
precedent for unlimited congressional authority fails on its own
terms. The argument ignores the possibility of ruling narrowly
confined to the peculiar circumstances giving rise to the ACA. A
recognition of congressional power to mandate that citizens enter
into qualifying private health insurance transactions would not, as
the Act’s constitutional opponents have maintained, necessitate the
conclusion that Congress could likewise mandate innumerable
other private transactions, such as the purchase of gym
memberships, automobiles, or even the dreaded broccoli.157
Healthcare is an unusual if not unique good, in that the need for it
is often sudden, unexpected, and life-threatening.158 Moreover, in
many such cases the needed care is catastrophically expensive.159
Finally, no mortal individual can ever be certain that she will not in
the future develop such a need for overwhelmingly expensive
care.160
None of this can be said about gym memberships,
automobiles, or leafy green vegetables.161 The distinctive nature of
the healthcare and health insurance markets matters because it
affords a basis for limiting the reach of any judicial ruling
sustaining the constitutionality of the ACA. A court could leave
157
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undecided whether Congress could mandate the purchase of
automobiles,162 say in order to stimulate a recovery in the auto
industry, for the unlikely day Congress attempts to do so. Were
that case ever to arise, it would present a genuinely open question,
as the fit between that purchase mandate and whatever perceived
problem prompted the law simply would not be the same as that
relied upon to sustain the ACA.
Upholding the ACA would, to be sure, require the Court to
abandon the mythical absolute bar on congressional regulation of
inactivity under the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper
Clause. But it would not of its own force bestow upon Congress a
wide-ranging authority to mandate private purchases. Were the
ACA found constitutional, notwithstanding its regulation of
“inactivity,” this conclusion would not make the fact that future
laws also regulated inactivity irrelevant the constitutional inquiry.
The ACA is premised on an extraordinarily strong case that a
purchase mandate is indispensable to a regulatory regime Congress
otherwise indisputably has power to enact.163 A court could be
confident that future assertions of the authority to mandate
purchases, should they ever present themselves, would not be
insulated from meaningful constitutional scrutiny by the precedent
of the ACA.
Close examination reveals that the consequences of
upholding the ACA have been greatly exaggerated.164 Moreover,
162
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as noted above, the worst that can be said about the law is that it is
without precedent, which ultimately means only that no existing
legal precedent dictates an answer to the constitutional question.
In this light, the arguments against the validity of the Act are not
implausible, but neither are they compelling. At best, the Act’s
opponents can argue the matter to a stalemate. The truly
disinterested judge would, in this worst case scenario for the law,
be left in equipoise, with little or no guidance from the traditional
sources of legal authority as to how to resolve the controversy.
Of course it is in precisely such circumstances that the
typically negligible pull of constitutional forbearance becomes
significant. And the strength of that attraction should turn in part
on the extent to which the cases have been politicized.
B. THE POLITICS OF “OBAMACARE”
Numerous characteristics of the Obamacare cases coalesce
to present an almost “perfect storm” of forbearance opportunity.
The most important is the political salience of the debate over
Obamacare. The extraordinary partisanship that has infected the
ensuing litigation has only exacerbated the political sensitivity of
the constitutional issue. In light of this context, the lawsuits
challenging the constitutionality of the individual mandate present
the courts with the most glaring opportunity for meaningful
constitutional forbearance since the missed opportunity provided
by the 2000 presidential election.165
1. The Bill
As the moniker “Obamacare” suggests, the ACA has
become a singularly signal achievement of the first two years of
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Obama’s presidency.166 It was enacted after more than a year of
vigorous congressional, and public, debate that stirred passions like
little else in the preceding two decades.167 That debate was
rancorous and, at times, unseemly.168 More to the point, it was
frequently conducted in apocalyptic terminology.169 It resulted in a
compromise that fully satisfied few, but that nevertheless was
promptly hailed as the culmination of three-quarters of a century of
Democratic efforts.170
Healthcare reform was one of the foremost domestic policy
issues addressed in the 2008 presidential election.171 As a
candidate, Obama adopted a more moderate position than Hillary
Clinton, eschewing her proposal that Congress enact a federal
mandate to purchase health insurance.172 His first few weeks as
President were consumed by the threat that the worst recession in
decades would deepen into a depression.173 But the Democratic
party chose to make healthcare a paramount priority of Obama’s
first term.174 By the end of March 2009, the chairs of the relevant
congressional committees, all Democrats, had largely settled on the
broad contours of legislative reform.175 Few if any anticipated that
the final vote on the legislation was still a year away.
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In June and July, committees in both the House and the
Senate approved different bills, albeit along strict party-line
votes.176 During the August recess, congressional town-hall
meetings became venues for contentious clashes over the proposed
legislation, at which members of Congress were “shouted down,
hanged in effigy and taunted” by the bills’ opponents, including
many affiliated with the emerging “Tea Party.”177 In some
instances the rudeness ripened into violence, with noisy
demonstrations leading to “to fistfights, arrests and
hospitalizations.”178 What initially appeared to be an organic,
grassroots movement was in fact the product of exhortations by
prominent conservative commentators such as Sean Hannity,
Glenn Beck, and Rush Limbaugh.179 Limbaugh went so far as to
suggest a likeness between the Obama Administration’s healthcare
logo and a symbol used by the Nazis.180 Several town-hall
meetings ended in chaos when crowds opposed to the proposed
legislation succeeded in drowning out the remarks of the
sponsoring member of Congress.181 Numerous congressional
Democrats received death threats.182
When members of Congress returned from the recess, they
brought the rancor with them. Speaking to a joint session of
Congress, President Obama disclaimed any intent to extend health
insurance coverage to illegal immigrants.183 In response, South
Carolina Republican Joe Wilson shouted, “you lie!”184 This
176
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extraordinary breach of decorum earned Wilson a formal rebuke
by the House of Representatives and prompted an extended public
discussion about the need for civility in political discourse.185 The
possibility of a bi-partisan effort grew increasingly remote.
That fall Democrats finally overrode steadfast Republican
opposition to pass separate bills in both chambers of Congress.
Speaker Pelosi cobbled together a fragile coalition of liberals and
more conservative “Blue Dog” Democrats sufficient to approve the
House bill by a narrow 220-215 vote on November 7.186 Then, in a
dramatic Christmas Eve session, the Senate passed its version of
the bill, defeating a threatened filibuster without the aid of a single
Republican vote.187 But each bill had yet to pass in the nonsponsoring chamber. And the August 2009 death of Senator
Kennedy ultimately threatened to tip the balance against reform in
the Senate.
In a stunning upset, Scott Brown won the special election
to fill Kennedy’s Senate seat after a hard-fought campaign in
which his most salient message was his pledge to vote against
healthcare reform.188 It appeared that the extended, rancorous, and
seemingly unprincipled log-rolling in Congress had soured public
support for the proposed legislation.189 Brown not only captured
what had for decades been a solidly Democratic seat190 but indeed
185
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occupied the place of a liberal icon who made the achievement of
universal healthcare his life-long objective.191 Conservative
pundits read in Brown’s election a message from the electorate to
President Obama that, in pressing for a healthcare overhaul, he had
misjudged the political tenor of the nation and exceeded his
mandate.192 Brown even garnered (and embraced) the nickname
“41,” a reference to the fact that his election provided the
Republicans just enough votes to maintain a filibuster in the
Senate.193 Contemporaneous national polls indicated that less than
40% of Americans approved the Administration’s proposal.194 In
the wake of Brown’s victory, healthcare reform was widely
deemed dead.195
Rumors of its demise, however, proved to be greatly
exaggerated. Faced with the prospect of a filibuster in the Senate,
Democrats shifted their efforts towards getting the House to
approve the Senate bill.196 Speaker Pelosi initially reported that
she lacked the votes.197 But after the promise of changes to
accommodate the concerns of the most liberal and the most
conservative Democrats, and a bi-partisan, day-long, televised
healthcare summit at the White House, majority support in the
House at last appeared to be within reach.198 Still, Pelosi and the
President lobbied and cajoled conservative House Democrats for
their support -- which ultimately proved fatal to some political
191
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careers -- until the eve of the scheduled floor vote.199 Particularly
difficult to resolve were controversies concerning the legislation’s
treatment of the ever volatile issue of abortion.200 Just hours
before the vote, the last holdout, Bart Stupak of Michigan, pledged
his support in exchange for the President’s promise to promulgate
a clarifying executive order prohibiting federal payment for
abortions.201 The final vote in the House was 219 in favor and 212
opposed.202 On Tuesday, March 23, 2010, President Obama
signed into law the ACA -- the first major legislation in
generations to be enacted without a single Republican vote.203
In short, the ACA reflected the settlement of a year-long,
deeply divisive, and profoundly partisan legislative ground war
over the structure of a multi-billion-dollar industry. Not since the
Civil and Voting Rights Acts of the 1960s had federal legislation
emerged from a similar crucible.204 This legislative history alone
should give prudent pause to judges called upon now to undo that
pact. Moreover, the unparalleled acrimony and duration of the
healthcare debate make it unusually difficult for judges, no less
than their fellow citizens, to avoid feeling a vested allegiance
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either for or against the law. In any event, as it turned out,
however, the Act’s political problems were just beginning.
2. The Statute
From the moment of enactment, repeal became a lodestar
for the Republican party.205 Support for the legislation became a
defining issue of the 2010 congressional elections, with
Republicans targeting vulnerable Democrats in swing districts.206
The strategy proved successful.207 Republicans took control of the
House and reduced the Democratic margin of majority in the
Senate.208
President Obama famously dubbed the 2010
congressional elections “a shellacking.”209 The new Speaker of the
House, John Boehner of West Chester, Ohio, promptly announced
his intention to seek repeal of the law, which he labeled “a
monstrosity.” Good to his word the first action taken by the new
House, after a public reading of the Constitution, was to vote to
repeal the ACA.210
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Of course the vote was largely symbolic, as the matter was
sure to die in the Senate, which it did.211 Boehner has also
threatened to block all funding to carry the law into effect, though
that remains to be seen.212 Thus, notwithstanding the March 2010
legislative victory, healthcare reform very much remains a leading
and dynamic issue. Only a few weeks into the 112th Congress it
became clear that the Democrats could not reenact the ACA if they
had to but neither could the Republicans effect a repeal. This
legislative stalemate is certain to become one of a very few
defining issues in the 2012 presidential election.
3. The Litigation
Within hours of the President’s signing of the ACA, a
coalition of partisan, elected state attorneys general and private
parties -- led by Bill McCollum, the Republican Attorney General
of Florida who was then a candidate for governor -- challenged the
constitutionality of the law in federal court.213 The case was
brought in Pensacola, which was thought likely, with good reason
it turns out, to assign a judge inclined to offer a sympathetic
hearing. This filing was accompanied by press releases and
conferences obviously aimed at deflecting at least some of the
Democrats glory and clouding the media message for the day.
Over the next few weeks, numerous additional suits were brought
challenging the constitutionality of the ACA. Seven states have
taken the extraordinary step of enacting state statutes or adopting
state constitutional amendments purporting to preclude
211
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enforcement of the ACA.214 Both the litigation and the state
statutes were then widely seen as largely symbolic. The statutes
were patently invalid under the Supremacy Clause, and most
commentators thought little more of the lawsuits, which were
decried as hallow publicity stunts.215
In these suits, the plaintiffs raised a broad array of
arguments. The Courts uniformly rejected nearly all these claims
as legally groundless. To the surprise of many, however, two
district court judges ultimately determined that Congress lacked
power to impose the individual mandate. The first, Judge Hudson
of the eastern district of Virginia, severed the mandate from the
rest of the massive law. The second, Judge Vinson, who sits in the
northern district of Florida where the first suit was filed,
invalidated the law in its entirety, though he later stayed his ruling
and allowed implementation efforts to go forward pending appeal
of his decision. These and other district court rulings now wait
review in the federal appeals courts.
The opinions of Judges Hudson and Vinson, and indeed of
all the judges to reach the merits, acknowledged the extraordinarily
divisive and partisan nature of the process leading to the law’s
enactment. They also expressly disclaimed that their decisions in
any way reflected their views about the wisdom of the law. That
all the judges reaching the merits found it necessary to state this
proposition, which in most cases is taken for granted,
unconsciously echoed Justice Owen Roberts’s notorious
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characterization of judicial review as mechanical in his discredited
opinion for the Court in United States v. Butler.216 Then, as now, it
might be thought that the judges “doth protest too much.”217
The inclusion of disclaimers such as these also reflected the
judges’ expectations that their opinions would soon be made
fodder for mass media. In this expectation they could not have
been disappointed. Few district court rulings merit discussion by
the President during his pre-Super-Bowl television interview.218
But of course, the district court decisions were themselves only
initial steps along the federal judicial path, and all such roads lead
to the Supreme Court. Talking heads, pundits of all stripes, and
even a few legal scholars were not in the least shy about predicting
the likely division of the Justices on the issue.219
The extent to which Justice Kagan should recuse herself
from cases due to her involvement with them while Solicitor
General has proven unusually contentious and garnered
disproportionate attention, which some have attributed to the
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possibility that her presence or absence might be decisive in a High
Court test of the ACA.220
The timing of the litigation continues to exacerbate its
political impact.221 If, as is expected, the various appeals are given
priority in the courts of appeals, the matter is on course for a
Supreme Court ruling in June of 2012.222 A decision at that date,
and especially one invalidating the law, would undoubtedly figure
prominently in the nationwide discussion leading to the fall
presidential election.223 Worse, the Justices’ opinions could be
crafted with that end in mind. It might even be unrealistic to think
that the Justices would not take into account their opinions’
potential value as partisan sound-bites.224
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Hence, nearly everything about the manner in which these
cases have been litigated, decided, and reported on by the press
suggests that they threaten to turn the federal judiciary into a
political football. To do so would, of course, further politicize this
theoretically apolitical branch of government and further erode
whatever difference remains between constitutional law and
partisan politics. Yet while these cases present the risk of
exacerbating these trends, they also present opportunity for the
judiciary to do much to reverse them. How they might do so is
discussed below.
C. What Forbearance Would Look Like
Each additional judicial opinion by a Republican-appointed
judge against the constitutionality of the individual mandate
bolsters the claim that the results in important constitutional cases
turn more on political preferences than on law. So the best thing
the federal judiciary can do is to stop issuing such opinions. Harm
has already been done by the two district court decisions
invalidating the law. But if they are reversed on appeal, and the
appellate courts are unanimous in upholding the law, that harm
will be contained. In such circumstances, the Supreme Court could
simultaneously avoid committing itself on the issue and stay out of
the fray by simply declining to exercise jurisdiction,225 an act
requiring no explanation and of no precedential significance.226
But if indeed past is prologue, at least one circuit court will
eventually rule against the constitutionality of the law, which will
in effect force the Supreme Court to decide the matter.227 Once
there, unanimity would again be ideal. It is also extremely
unlikely. Justice Thomas has since Lopez consistently called for
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the abandonment of the substantial effects test and a return to an
understanding of the Commerce Clause more in keeping with that
of the 1780s.228
For present purposes, the key word is
“consistently.” This means that his vote will do little or no harm to
the notion that constitutional law is more than just politics. By
repeatedly adhering to his narrow understanding of federal
legislative power in the face of what must have mighty
temptations to yield to his contrary policy preferences,229 Justice
Thomas has earned the right to vote to strike down “Obamacare.”
No fair assessment of his record on congressional power would
dismiss such a vote as mere politics.
The same cannot be said for any of his conservative
brethren. All four of them have in recent years strayed from their
federalism vows,230 and their purported discovery of an inflexible
commitment to them when ruling on “Obamacare” would fool
none but the foolhardy. Accordingly, to be truly efficacious as an
act of constitutional forbearance, the Roberts Court must not only
uphold the ACA but do so by an 8-1 margin. The significance of
the Court’s forbearance would be dissipated to the extent that less
steadfast friends of strict limits on federal power choose this case
to join Justice Thomas. And, while marginally better than a ruling
invalidating the law, a 5-4 decision upholding the law would
merely confirm the many predictions that the
Justices would
divide along partisan lines with the most moderate conservative,
Justice Kennedy, casting the deciding vote.231
D. Forbearance is not Abdication
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One person’s constitutional forbearance might be another’s
political cowardice. In this light, it is worth asking whether there
exists a category of cases in which the kinds of societal and
institutional considerations that forbearance serves should play
little or no role whatsoever in a judge’s thinking?
The most compelling candidate would be the category of cases
in which the judiciary alone could realistically be expected to act
impartially. One of the most significant theories of modern
constitutional law articulated in the last half of the twentieth
century was set forth in John Hart Ely’s seminal Democracy and
Distrust.232 In that book he argued, among other things, that much
of modern constitutional law could best be understood as reflecting
the Court’s intuitions about when ordinary political processes were
trustworthy and when systemic problems suggested that they were
not. In the latter cases, it was argued, the Court intervened either
to clear away a barrier to the healthy functioning of the political
process,233 or failing that, to correct errors the political process
itself could never adequately address.234 This is no place to take
up a general evaluation of Ely’s theory. In any event, it suffices
for present purposes to observe that it remains a dominant theme in
the legal literature.235 For one does not have to be a partisan or
devotee of the theory to acknowledge that it reflects some degree
of both descriptive and normative truth.
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Whatever weight ought to be accorded considerations of
process failure, there are no reasons to think that they afford a
basis to invalidate the ACA. As recounted above, the law is the
product of one of the most salient, extended, and passionate
political debates in modern memory.236 While this conversation
was at times uncivil,237 no one can credibly claim that the March
23, 2010 enactment caught him unawares. And the political
conversation continues and will undoubtedly be a major issue in
the 2012 election as it was last fall.
Far more importantly, however, is the fact that the
individual mandate, the only provision in the law found by any
judge to be of doubtful constitutional validity, is exactly the kind
of legal imposition which the political process is most likely to
impose justly. As Justice Jackson observed more than sixty years
ago,
The framers of the Constitution knew, and we
should not forget today, that there is no more
effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government than to require that the
principles of law which officials would impose
upon a minority must be imposed generally.
Conversely, nothing opens the door to arbitrary
action so effectively as to allow those officials to
pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply
legislation and thus to escape the political
retribution that might be visited upon them if larger
numbers were affected. Courts can take no better
measure to assure that laws will be just than to
require that laws be equal in operation.238
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The constitutional challenges to the individual mandate have
emphasized the unprecedented breadth of this requirement.239 To
be sure, aside from a few narrow exceptions,240 the mandate does
indeed apply virtually to every American.241 And it is precisely the
mandate’s all-encompassing nature that makes the case for judicial
intervention so weak. The universality of the requirement is itself
the most “effective practical guaranty against arbitrary and
unreasonable government”242 for which one could wish. If the
mandate, which has of course not yet gone into effect, proves in
practice to be an intolerable yoke upon the citizenry, Congress and
the President will be unable “to escape the [resulting] political
retribution,”243 and their successors will repeal the law. Far from
necessitating judicial intervention,244 the circumstances of the
ACA’s individual mandate provision bolster the case for leaving
the issue to the ordinary political process.

Conclusion
For better or worse, the federal judiciary has already been
drawn deeply and irreversibly into the healthcare-reform-debate
maelstrom. Additional federal judicial rulings on the merits of the
constitutional arguments arrayed against the statute are inevitable,
and a decision by the U.S. Supreme Court finally resolving the
matter seems likely as well.
The ACA cases give those conservative federal judges and
Justices who will decide them an almost perfect opportunity to do
239
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something that is sorely needed and long overdue, and that is to
begin restoration of a distinction between constitutional law and
partisan politics. Few would doubt that these judges must be
sorely tempted to seize the tools afforded by the notoriously
indeterminate law of the post-Lopez Commerce Clause
jurisprudence and employ them to dismantle a federal program
detested by the American right like little else. What is more, the
cases are on a timeline such that they also offer the chance to rob
the incumbent Democratic President of the signal achievement of
his first term in the midst of his re-election campaign. Millions
already believe that these kinds of considerations will prove
decisive in the minds of judges, whether or not they operate
consciously. Further judicial rulings along partisan lines of
division will deepen such suspicions in countless future cases.
For the same reasons, were these judges to resist this
temptation and forego the partisan bounty it promises, they would
demonstrate by their actions what a less partisan constitutional law
would look like. To be sure, were this to occur it would be but a
small step toward a transformation of our legal and political
culture. But it may be a generation before another opportunity as
significant as this one presents itself. Moreover, the cases are well
timed in another way, and that is that the Roberts Court has yet to
address the precedential significance of Lopez and Morrison.
There will never be a better time for the Roberts Court to signal
that it will not countenance gamesmanship with constitutional
principle. There may never be a better opportunity for the Roberts
Court, should it reach the matter, to exercise constitutional
forbearance.
To be clear, only the naive can at this point in our history
expect that it will do so. The Court has recently had countless
opportunities, albeit few quite as good the present one, to exercise
forbearance and it has repeatedly declined to do so. There is little
reason to believe that the Justices will suddenly and dramatically
re-orient their values in this instance. But why not? Now might be
a good time to start thinking about who is to blame.
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